



Reverse Engineering

Ingeniería Inversa

Teoría y práctica

Course

Análisis y Detección de Malware

Instructor

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Lecture notes

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Introduction

Introducción

Temario



Introduction

Ingeniería Inversa

- El **holismo** es una posición metodológica y epistemológica que postula cómo los sistemas y sus propiedades, deben ser **analizados en su conjunto** y no solo a través de las partes que los componen.
- Pero aún consideradas éstas separadamente, **analiza y observa el sistema como un todo integrado y global** que en definitiva determina cómo se comportan las partes, mientras que un mero análisis de éstas no puede explicar por completo el funcionamiento del **todo**.

- La ingeniería inversa (II) estudia o analiza un producto disponible en el mercado (software, dispositivo electrónico, pieza mecánica, estructura, etc.) con el fin de **conocer detalles de su diseño, construcción y operación**.
- La II usada como una forma de producir una versión mejorada del producto y no con el objetivo de producir una **copia normalmente ilegal o alterar su funcionamiento original** (cracking de contraseñas).
- La II se ha incluido en algunos currículos de los programas de ingeniería ya que se requiere una metodología con la cual se adquieren algunas habilidades como son:

*Entender de manera **holística** un producto de ingeniería, plantearse hipótesis, revisar los conceptos físicos y realizar experimentación para validar las hipótesis, y proponer nuevas mejoras sobre el diseño, construcción y operación del producto*





Reverse engineering

Ingeniería Inversa

- Se ha utilizado en el desarrollo de la ingeniería, como es el caso de:
 - Muchas empresas de producción que iniciaron copiando un producto, y posteriormente optimizándolo.
 - Las industrias militares que mejoraron su tecnología a partir del material de guerra incautado a los ejércitos enemigos.
- Otro uso de la II (caso Corea) que la usó como herramienta de innovación para conservar la independencia de los países desarrollados por lo que primero promovió el flujo de la tecnología en el país para luego no pagar licencias de productos que podían obtener a través de la II.





Introduction

Ingeniería Inversa

Hacer II puede requerir varias actividades que dependen del área (Hardware/Software) como son:

- Elaborar un modelo de caja negra y validarlo:
Identificar entradas y salidas.
Identificar y agrupan los subsistemas, componentes, funciones, interacciones y flujos.
- Identificar el protocolo de comunicación utilizado:
Mensajes, protocolos de red, identificadores/llaves, etc.
- Identificar los componentes internos
Para **malware**
Des-ensamblar/Decompilar un archivo ejecutable.





Introduction

Ingeniería Inversa

El análisis de un programa se puede hacer de 3 formas:

- Caja negra: no se sabe nada.
- Caja blanca: se tiene acceso al código fuente y la documentación
- Caja gris: se tiene información parcial.

Hay algo similar en:

1. El desarrollo de software:
Pruebas de software de caja negra
2. El hackeo ético (pentesting)





Introduction

Conceptos básicos

SysAdmin, Audit, Network and Security
Organismo privado de EU con fines de
lucro: entrenamiento
<https://www.sans.org/>

Definiciones

- Es el estudio o proceso para determinar la **funcionalidad**, el origen y el impacto potencial de una muestra determinada de malware, como un virus, un gusano, un troyano, un rootkit o una puerta trasera [Wikipedia].
- El **SANS** define Objetivos, Tipos, Herramientas, Metodología, Adquisición, y Detección, todo dentro del marco de la Respuesta a **Incidentes** de Seguridad
<https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/malicious/malware-analysis-introduction-2103>
- El examen de software malicioso implica varias etapas, que incluyen, entre otras, las siguientes:
 1. Realizar Ingeniería Inversa de forma manual al código.
 2. Análisis de comportamiento Interactivo
 3. Análisis de propiedades estáticas.
 4. Análisis totalmente automatizado





Introduction

Tipos de análisis

El análisis y la detección de malware se puede hacer de dos formas:

- **Análisis estático**
Estudio del malware sin tener que ejecutarlo.
Se revisa su estructura: código binario.
- **Análisis dinámico**
Se ejecuta el malware y se obtiene su comportamiento, es decir, se identificas todas sus actividades, por ej. leer, modificar o borrar archivos.





Introduction

Tipos de análisis

En ambos tipos de análisis se puede procesar la muestra de malware de dos formas:

- Código Fuente

Depende del tipo de lenguaje: compilado e interpretado.

Para los interpretados siempre está disponible (PHP, Bash, etc.).

- Código Binario

Requiere saber como fue generado:

1. Conocer el compilador.
2. Conocer el procesador.





Análisis de archivos

Conceptos

Herramientas





Análisis de archivos

Conceptos

- Analizadores de ejecutables
 - Saben leer e interpretar la estructura de un archivo ejecutable.
 - Depende del sistema operativo:
 - PE (*Portable Executable*) para Windows.
 - ELF (*Executable and Linkable Format*) para sistemas Like-UNIX (Linux, BSD, etc).
 - Mach-O para Mac OS X.
 - Una gran cantidad de herramientas:
 - PE: pev (<http://pev.sourceforge.net/>).
 - ELF: GUI (ELFparser), CLI (readelf).





Análisis de archivos

Proceso = Programa en Ejecución (esta en la RAM + registros)

Código	+	Datos	+	Pila
<u>Instrucciones</u>		Variables <u>globales</u> <u>estáticas</u> y dinámicas		Funciones parámetros var locales


- Un archivo EXE no tiene todo.
- Además no es una secuencia de datos, de bytes
 - Sino una secuencia de bloques de datos: segmentos, secciones.





Análisis de archivos

- **Segments** are divided into sections, each section has an utility for the ELF file.
- **Sections** per se, are not useful at runtime, so they are only useful at [link time](#).
- Segments are used for creating a block of memory, with some specific permissions and store there some content.
- Sections gather all needed information to link a given object file and build an executable, while Program Headers split the executable into segments with different attributes, which will eventually be loaded into memory.





Formato ELF


Para sistemas UNIX

Intro





1 Header	2 Mapping	3 Execution
the ELF header is parsed the Program Header is parsed (Sections are not used)	the file is mapped in memory according to its segment(s)	Entry is called Syscalls⁼⁼ are accessed via: - Syscall number in the EAX register - calling Interrupt 0x80



The ELF was first specified by U.S. L. and U.I. for UNIX System V, in 1989

The ELF is used, among others, in:

- Linux, Android, *BSD, Solaris, BeOS
- PSP, Playstation 2-4, Dreamcast, GameCube, Wii
- various OSes made by Samsung, Ericsson, Nokia,
- Microcontrollers from Atmel, Texas Instruments

version 1.0a
2013/11/22

Ange Albertini
corkami.com

```

$ ./simple.elf
Hello World!

```

simple.elf

<http://www.vexxbot.com/2014/05/01/creating-elf-binaries-with-gcc-4-8-2-on-ubuntu-14-04-lts/>
 @vexxbot

sections

header^{2/2}
Technical details for linking
(ignored for execution)

ELF header
identify as an ELF type
specify the architecture

Program Header table

Cod

Data

Sections' names

Section Header table

1. ELF Header

Hexadecimal dump	ASCII dump	Fields	Values	Explanation
7F 45 4C 46 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.ELF.....	e_ident	0x7F, ".ELF"	constant signature
02 00 03 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		ei_class, ei_data	1, 1	32 bits, Little-Endian
10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 34 00 20 00 01 00 20 00	4....	ei_version	1	Always 1
04 00 03 00		e_type	2	Executable
		e_machine	3	Intel 386 (and later)
		e_version	1	Always 1
		e_entry	0x00000008	Address where execution starts
		e_shoff	0x00	Program Headers' offset
		e_shoff	0x00	Section Headers' offset
		e_ehsize	0x34	ELF header's size
		e_phsize	0x20	Size of a single Program Header
		e_phnum	1	Count of Program Headers
		e_shsize	0x28	Size of a single Section Header
		e_shnum	1	Count of Section Headers
		e_shstrndx	1	Index of the names' section in the table

2. Program Headers

Hexadecimal dump	ASCII dump	Fields	Values	Explanation
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		p_type	8	The segment should be loaded in memory
		p_offset	0	Offset where it should be read
		p_addr	0x00000000	Virtual address where it should be loaded
		p_paddr	0x00000000	Physical address where it should be loaded
		p_filesz	0x00	Size on file
		p_memsz	0x00	Size in memory
		p_flags	0x00	Readable and executable

3. Section Headers

Hexadecimal dump	ASCII dump	Fields	Values	Explanation
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_name	0x00000000	Section name
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_type	0x00000000	Section type
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_flags	0x00000000	Section flags
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addr	0x00000000	Section address
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_offset	0x00000000	Section offset
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_size	0x00000000	Section size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_link	0x00000000	Section link
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
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00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_entsize	0x00000000	Section entry size
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_info	0x00000000	Section info
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		sh_addralign	0x00000000	Section addralign

This is the whole file, however, most ELF files contain many more elements. Explanations are simplified, for conciseness.



ELF

UNIX

Referencias

- http://www.skyfree.org/linux/references/ELF_Format.pdf
- <https://linux-audit.com/elf-binaries-on-linux-understanding-and-analysis/>
- <https://gist.github.com/DtxdF/e6d940271e0efca7e0e2977723aec360>

Comentarios

- El formato original fue el [a.out](#).





Formato PE

Para Windows Microsoft

Intro





PE


Windows

PE¹⁰¹ a windows executable walkthrough



Ange Albertini
corkami.com

Dissected PE



header
technical details about the executable

sections
contents of the executable

DOS header
shows it's a binary

PE header
shows it's a modern binary

optional header
executable information

data directories
pointers to extra structures (exports, imports, ...)

sections table
defines how the file is loaded in memory

code
what is executed

imports
link between the executable and (Windows) libraries

data
information used by the code

Loading process

1 Headers


The DOS Header is parsed first. The PE Header is then the Optional Header is parsed (if it exists the PE Header).

2 Sections table

The sections table is parsed. It contains Name/Size/PointerToRawData/PointerToRelocations. It is checked for validity with alignments. Relocations are then processed.


3 Mapping

The file is mapped in memory according to the sections table. The sections are mapped to the virtual address space.




4 Imports

DataDirectories are parsed. They contain the names of the DLLs that the program depends on. The DLLs are loaded in memory. The names are then used to find the DLLs.



5 Execution

Code is called at the EntryPoint. The code then runs. The program's execution starts at the EntryPoint.




Notes

PE HEADER aka DOS HEADER
Starts with 'MZ' (initials of Mark Zborowski MS-DOS developer)
PE HEADER aka IMAGE_FILE_HEADER / COFF file header
Starts with 'PE' (Portable Executable)
OPTIONAL HEADER aka IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
Optional only for non-standard PE but required for executables
RVA Relative Virtual Address
Address relative to ImageBase (at ImageBase, RVA = 0)
Almost all addresses of the headers are RVAs
In code, addresses are not relative.
INT Import Name Table
Null-terminated list of pointers to Hint, Name structures
IAT Import Address Table
Null-terminated list of pointers
On file it's a copy of the INT
After loading it points to the imported APIs
HINT
Index in the exports table of a DLL to be imported
Not required but provides a speed-up by reducing look-up

PE

Windows





PE

Windows

Referencias

Oficial

- <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format>

Varias

- <https://wiki.osdev.org/PE>

Comentarios

- Se usa a partir de Win95 y Win NT.
- Se basa en el formato COFF (*Common Object File Format*)
- Para .NET es un contenedor de Cli y Mono.





Formato Mach-O

Para Apple, macOS e iOS

Intro





THIS KIND OF MACH-O FILES IS ONLY SUPPORTED SINCE OS X VERSION 10.8 (MOUNTAIN LION).
THIS IS THE WHOLE FILE, HOWEVER, MOST MACH-O FILES CONTAIN MANY MORE ELEMENTS.
EXPLANATIONS ARE SIMPLIFIED FOR CONCISENESS.



Des-ensambladores

De binarios / Ejecutables

Conceptos y
Herramientas





Des-ensamblador

Concepto

- Un **desensamblador** es un programa que traduce el lenguaje de máquina a lenguaje ensamblador, la operación inversa de la que hace el ensamblador.
- Un desensamblador difiere de un **decompilador**, en que éste tiene como objetivo un lenguaje de alto nivel en vez de al lenguaje ensamblador.
- La salida de un desensamblador, es a menudo formateada para la legibilidad humana en vez de ser adecuada para la entrada a un ensamblador, haciendo que éste sea principalmente una **herramienta de ingeniería inversa**.
- Algunos desensambladores hacen uso de la información de depuración simbólica presente en los archivos objeto para facilitar la comprensión.

Links


- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disassembler>.





Conceptos

Flujo





Des-ensamblador

Concepto

Problemas

- El desensamblado no es una ciencia exacta.
 - En las plataformas CISC con instrucciones de ancho variable, o en presencia de código automodificable, es posible para un simple programa tener dos o más desensamblados razonables.
- El código fuente en lenguaje ensamblador generalmente permite el uso de constantes y comentarios del programador.
 - Estos son generalmente removidos, por el ensamblador, del código ensamblado a código de máquina.
 - Por lo anterior el resultado de un desensamblador carece de esta información lo que hace que la salida sea más difícil de ser interpretada por un humano.
- No es capaz de distinguir:
 - Las estructuras de control de flujo (if, for, while).
 - Tampoco los nombres de las variables, así que suele inventar nombres como VAR_0001, VAR_0002, etc.





Des-ensamblador (comparison table)

Tabla comparativa

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">1. Analysis<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. Call/syscall recognition2. Cross-references3. DWARF support4. dSym support5. Signature recognition6. Custom structures definition7. Type support8. Diffing2. Architectures<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. ARM2. CSR3. Java/Dalvik4. TMS320C55x+5. V8506. x86 and x64.3. Bindings<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. Javascript2. Lua3. Python | <ul style="list-style-type: none">4. Debugger<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. Breakpoints2. Process attaching3. Remote debugging4. Tracing5. Emulation5. Platforms<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. Android2. BSD3. iPhone4. Linux5. OSX6. Windows6. Decompilation<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. ARM2. X643. x86 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">7. User interface<ul style="list-style-type: none">1. CLI2. GUI3. Themes support4. Web interface5. Graphs6. Ascii graphs |
|---|--|---|

Y muchas más características.





Des-ensambladores

Descripción

Práctica

- Para familiarizarse con las variantes de archivos ejecutables que existen, se recomienda compilar y analizar varios archivos binarios.
- Las variantes más importantes son:

Formato	Sistema Operativo	Procesadores	Aplicación
PE	Cygwin, mingw32, Win	ia64, x86, x64	ls, bash
ELF	Linux, NetBSD, OpenBSD	PowerPC	
Mach-O		ARM	

- URL
 - <https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/binary-samples>





Des-ensambladores

Descripción

[Ver slides de Ensamblador](#)

Disassembler

- It is the exact opposite of an [assembler](#). Where an assembler converts code written in an assembly language into binary machine code, a disassembler reverses the process and attempts to recreate the assembly code from the binary machine code.
- Since most assembly languages have a one-to-one correspondence with underlying machine instructions, the process of disassembly is relatively straight-forward, and a basic disassembler can often be implemented simply by reading in bytes, and performing a table lookup.
- Of course, disassembly has its own problems and pitfalls:
 - Separating code from data
 - Lost information (variable names)





Des-ensambladores

Descripción

- Akin to Disassembly, **decompilers** take the process a step further and actually try to reproduce the code in a high level language. Frequently, this high level language is C, because C is simple and primitive enough to facilitate the decompilation process.
- Decompilation does have its drawbacks, because lots of data and readability constructs are lost during the original compilation process, and they cannot be reproduced.





Des-ensambladores

Lista

Hay realmente **muchos** des-ensambladores y unos pocos menos de-compiladores:

1. IDA (Interactive DisAssembler) Comercial, Limitations-Freeware
2. Hopper Comercial, Limitations
3. x64dbg Open Source
4. Immunity Debugger
5. PE Explorer's disassembler Comercial 129 dol canadienses
6. Hiew Comercial
7. Radare2 Open Source
8. ODA desensamblador en línea .

Links

- https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/X86_Disassembly/Disassemblers_and_Decompile
- <http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/1817/is-there-any-disassembler-to-rival-ida-pro>





Herramientas de análisis

Con GUI o Terminal

Ejemplos





Herramientas de análisis

Introducción

- Examinadores de archivos:
 - Ejecutables de los sistemas operativos: PE, ELF, Mach-O.
 - Des-ensambladores y de-compiladores.
- Depuradores
 - Ejecutan el malware a bajo nivel (ensamblador) mediante un control fino (paso a paso) y con posibilidad de examinar y alterar las variables (zonas de memoria).
- Entornos controlados:
 - Ambientes seguros para ejecutar el malware.
 - No se propaga ni daña información real.





Herramientas

De análisis

Veremos la lista detalla en los slides
Herramientas_analisis





Volcado de memoria

Toda o por proceso

Conceptos, herramientas.





Volcado de memoria

Introducción

- Definición:
 - Es un registro no estructurado del **contenido de la memoria** en un momento concreto, generalmente utilizado para depurar un programa que ha finalizado su ejecución incorrectamente.
 - Actualmente se refiere a un archivo que contiene una **imagen en memoria de un proceso** determinado.
- Herramientas:
 - Gratuitas: Volatility, Rekall
 - Comerciales: Varias usadas en:
DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response)

Links

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_dump.
- <https://github.com/digitalisx/awesome-memory-forensics>





Courses

Cursos

Gratuitos





Courses

Cursos

Existen muchos en internet y dentro de los más conocidos:



- Ricardo Narvaja
 - Argentino que pertenece al grupo CRACKSLATINOS.
- Cursos centrados en Windows
 - Windows reversing:
Function calls & Syscalls, DLLs, Structures.
 - <https://tryhackme.com/room/windowsreversingintro>
- Cursos con repaso de todo lo necesario:
 - Notación en hexadecimal, ensamblador (registros), etc.
 - <https://0xinfection.github.io/reversing/>





Courses

Cursos

En sus videos comenta la evolución del tema y como se ha ido actualizando
Radare, Ghidra

Ricardo Narvaja

- Todo el material es gratuito.
 - Herramientas principalmente: IDA y OllyDbg.
 - Empieza desde cero con cursos de C y Sistemas Operativos.
 - Se centra principalmente en arquitectura x86.
 - Tienes varias prácticas cuyo nivel se incrementa poco a poco.
 - Material de Youtube, documentos en Word y muchos archivos de ejemplos para las prácticas.
- Referencias
 - <https://ricardonarvaja.info/>
 - Algunos navegadores detectan posible malware en su sitio por el tipo de material que publica pero no es cierto.





Prácticas

Análisis estático

Ejercicios





Práctica

Análisis Estático

Analizar un binario

- Con varias herramientas: GUI, CLI y API
- Obtener información diversa
- Analizar en su conjunto toda la información
 - Tipo de archivo y cadenas
 - Encabezado
 - Librerías que usa y tipo
 - Ensamblador
 - Etc.





Práctica

Análisis Estático

Ejemplo

- Usaremos el comando ls de Linux.
- Tipo de archivo

\$ file /bin/ls

ls: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=bccb4c17516c6a9ad59c3ec19b347c83236c04c2, stripped

Formato: ELF
Procesador: x86-64, 64 bits
SO: GNU/Linux
ABI: SYSV
Opciones: stripped (has no debugging symbols)





Práctica

Análisis Estático

- Encabezado

\$ readelf -e /bin/ls

ELF Header:

Magic: 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Class: ELF64
Data: 2's complement, little endian
Version: 1 (current)
OS/ABI: UNIX - System V
ABI Version: 0
Type: DYN (Shared object file)
Machine: Advanced Micro Devices X86-64
Version: 0x1
Entry point address: 0x5e50
Start of program headers: 64 (bytes into file)
Start of section headers: 141240 (bytes into file)
Flags: 0x0
Size of this header: 64 (bytes)
Size of program headers: 56 (bytes)
Number of program headers: 11
Size of section headers: 64 (bytes)
Number of section headers: 31
Section header string table index: 30





Práctica

Análisis Estático

- Encabezado

\$ readelf -S /bin/l

There are 31 [section](#) headers, starting at offset 0x227b8

Section Headers:

[Nr]	Name	Type	Address	Offset	Size	EntSize	Flags	Link	Info	Align
[0]		NULL	0000000000000000	00000000	0000000000000000	0000000000000000	0	0	0	
...										
[30]	.shstrtab	STRTAB	0000000000000000	00022674	000000000000013e	0000000000000000	0	0	1	

Key to Flags:

W (write), A (alloc), X (execute), M (merge), S (strings), I (large)

I (info), L (link order), G (group), T (TLS), E (exclude), x (unknown)

O (extra OS processing required) o (OS specific), p (processor specific)

\$ readelf -s /bin/l

[Symbol table](#) '.dynsym' contains 135 entries:

Num:	Value	Size	Type	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
0:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND	
...							
134:	00000000000016680	104	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	15	_obstack_free





Práctica

Análisis Estático

- Información general

\$ exiftool /bin/ls

ExifTool Version Number : 11.11
File Name : ls
Directory : /bin
File Size : 183 kB
Resource Fork Size : 36 kB
File Modification Date/Time : 2022:02:06 15:22:11-06:00
File Access Date/Time : 2022:02:06 15:22:11-06:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2022:02:06 15:22:11-06:00
File Permissions : rwxr-xr-x
File Type : Mach-O fat binary executable
File Type Extension :
MIME Type : application/octet-stream
CPU Count : 2
CPU Type : x86 64-bit, ARM 64-bit
CPU Subtype : i386 (all) 64-bit, ARM A500 64-bit
Object File Type : Demand paged executable





Práctica

Análisis Estático

Ejemplo

- Firma hash

```
$ sha1sum /bin/l
```

```
68d3a4e823b804d4ae...94bd49ad7fad3264475 ls
```

- Cadenas (any sequence of 4 -the default- or more printing characters)

```
$ strings /bin/l
```

```
68d3a4e823b804d4ae...94bd49ad7fad3264475 ls
```

```
$ strings ls | wc -l
```

```
1620
```

```
$ strings ls | awk '{ print length(), $0 | "sort -n" }'
```

```
4 $E1
```

```
...
```

```
80 --sort=WORD
```

```
sort by WORD instead of name: none (-U), size (-S),
```

Lista ordenada por tamaño

```
$ strings ls | head
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
libselinux.so.1
_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
__gmon_start__
_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
...
```





Práctica

Análisis Estático

Generar el ensamblador

- Con GUI
 - IDA
 - Ghidra
- Con CLI
 - Ejecutan el malware a bajo nivel (ensamblador) mediante un control fino (paso a paso) y con posibilidad de examinar y alterar las variables (zonas de memoria).
- Con API
 - Ambientes seguros para ejecutar el malware.
 - No se propaga ni daña información real.





Práctica

Análisis Estático

Ejemplo

- Ensamblador

```
$ objdump -d ls | head
```

```
ls:          file format elf64-x86-64
```

```
Disassembly of section .init:
```

```
0000000000000358 <.init>:
```

3588:	f3 0f 1e fa	endbr64
358c:	48 83 ec 08	subq \$8, %rsp
3590:	48 8b 05 19 da 21 00	movq 2218521(%rip), %rax # 220fb0

```
$ objdump -d ls | grep "Disassembly of section"
```

```
Disassembly of section .init:
```

```
Disassembly of section .plt:
```

```
Disassembly of section .plt.sec:
```

```
Disassembly of section .text:
```

```
Disassembly of section .fini:
```

```
$ objdump -d ls | wc -l
20139
```

```
$ objdump -d ls | grep ">:"
```

```
0000000000000358 <.init>:
```

```
000000000000035b <.plt>:
```

```
00000000000003cc <.plt.sec>:
```

```
000000000000043c <.text>:
```

```
0000000000001650 <_obstack_begin>:
```

```
0000000000001652 <_obstack_begin_1>:
```

```
0000000000001654 <_obstack_newchunk>:
```

```
0000000000001664 <_obstack_allocated_p>:
```

```
0000000000001668 <_obstack_free>:
```

```
000000000000166f <_obstack_memory_used>:
```

```
00000000000016fd <.fini>:
```





Práctica

Análisis Estático

Radare2

\$ r2 ls.bin

-- Use the 'id' command to see the source line related to the current seek

[0x00005e50]> **aaa**

[x] Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa)

[x] Analyze function calls (aac)

[x] Analyze len bytes of instructions for references (aar)

[x] Check for objc references

[x] Check for vtables

[x] Type matching analysis for all functions (aaft)

[x] Propagate noreturn information

[x] Use -AA or aaaa to perform additional experimental analysis.

[0x00005e50]> **pd** \$s > ls.radare2.asm





Práctica

Conclusión

Análisis

- Mucha información puede ser extraída del ejecutable.
- Esta información puede ser usada para detectar malware?
Si, la reflexión sería: es necesaria toda? Como se procesa?
- Queremos encontrar un patrón que se repita en todos los mlwrs.
- Como se construyen los patrones?
 - Estáticamente: por ejemplo una cadena o secuencia de bytes.
 - Estadísticamente: contar elementos.
 - Híbrido: usar varias características.
- Procedimiento
 - Analizar varios archivos
 - Proponer y encontrar el patrón
 - Verificar la propuesta





The end

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